Evaluation of the Utility Function of an Environmental asset: Contingent valuation Method (CVM) by Ali, Bouchrika et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Evaluation of the Utility Function of an
Environmental asset: Contingent
valuation Method (CVM)
Bouchrika Ali and Issaoui FakhriI and Jouber Habib
ISG GABES, ESEN MANOUBA, ISG GABES
6. December 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/60421/
MPRA Paper No. 60421, posted 7. December 2014 21:01 UTC
1 
 
Evaluation of the Utility Function of an Environmental asset: Contingent valuation 
Method (CVM) 
 
 
Ali BOUCHRIKA
1
, Fakhri ISSAOUI
2,*
 Habib JOUBER
3,
 
 
1
Higher Institute of Management, University of Gabès, Tunisia. 
2 
Higher School of Digital Economy, University of Manouba 
*Corresponding author E-mail:fakhriissaoui@yahoo.fr 
3
LARTIGE, Higher Institute of Management, University of Gabès, Tunisia. 
 
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to introduce the Contingent valuation Method (CVM) as an 
efficient method allowing to modify the utility level, of an economic agent to following the 
consumption of environmental goods. In the absence of the market for natural assets, the CVM 
allows us to create a hypothetical market to evaluate the economic value of those assets by 
purchase and sale transactions. However, this valuation can be constrained with the quality 
problem of the physical nature of those environmental assets. The theoretical framework had 
shown that a change in the utility function and consumer surplus on the one hand, price and 
profit of the monopoly on the other hand,  is be needed to keep the measures of economic 
efficiency and social equity. 
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1. Introduction  
 
In the absence of markets allowing to providing a real measure of the economic value of 
environmental assets, hypothetical or simulated markets are used. The contingent valuation 
method (CVM) uses this approach (creation of hypothetical markets) where users could 
simulate buying and selling products and services linked to environemental assets. This method 
is based on consumer surveys. The theoretical basis of the CVM is based on the theory of 
economic utility and the welfare theory. It is asked to individuals to directly reveal their 
preferences in terms of WTP subsequently to different scenarios presented to them. Indeed, 
given its importance, the contingent valuation approach has been widely used in several areas 
such as ecotourism; forest management, health infrastructure, the finance ... etc. 
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Various studies conducted in developing countries on the economic evaluation of 
environmental assets well have concluded to the effectiveness of the CVM (Whittington, Laura 
and Mu 1991; Whittington et al 1990). Also, several government and international agencies use 
the information provided by these studies to base their decisions (as US Environmental 
Protection Agency, World Bank). In general, in all cases where the preference revelation of 
households is necessary to improve the management of an environmental asset, the CVM is 
supposed to be the most appropriate technique (Georgiou et al (1997)). 
 
However, like any method of observation, the CVM suffers from some limits well recognized 
by theorists. First, the reliability of the CVM depends on the design and management of the 
investigation, which mean the intervention of subjective considerations. Second, this method 
suffers mostly of bias problems, which are commonly found in statistical surveys, such as 
sampling error; misspecification of the WTP scenario and the lack of explanatory variables ... 
etc (Freeman 1979). Nevertheless, despite all problems mentioned above, this method still valid 
to value an environmental asset. The previous researches showed that the CVM could be 
applied to estimate the willingness to pay to receive better service or to allow price changes 
without affecting the well-being of users. This method offers intensive informations and allows 
consumers to assess their utility functions. 
 
It should be noted that the economic problem related to the concept of the environment is the 
existence of external effects so common.  Recall that the externality exists when the activity of 
an economic agent affects the usefulness of other agents, without existence of transactions or 
compensation on the market. Indeed, the respect and protection of environmental resources is 
achieved when the community records a surplus in its well-being (for example an improvement 
in the quality of the environment, or damage assessment related to environmental degradation 
allowing  the adoption of new economic policies aiming to reproduce the environmental 
resources). However, the major problem facing the environmental goods is the absence of a real 
market through which passes the environmental assets transactions. But we should note that the 
absence of market and price system does not mean that environmental assets have not no value.  
So it is necessary to try to measure even approximately all profits generated by these 
environmental assets. 
 
Thus, it seems necessary to address the value of environmental assets through various valuation 
methods. In this perspective the economic theory has developed a range of assessment methods 
in consumer preferences which are used in the case of absence of markets (for example, the 
CVM which is able to measure all the values of environmental goods).  
 
Thus, in this context is elaborates our paper which aims the valuation of environmental goods 
using the CVM by some changes in the utility function of consumers. To well respond to our 
problematic we will divide the article in five sections. The second one will analyses how the 
economic value of an environmental asset is determined. The third section shows how the 
CVM determines the WTP. The fourth section will analyze the change in the value of 
individual utilities following a change in the quality of environmental assets. The fifth and last 
section concludes the paper. 
 
2. The economic value of an environmental asset 
 
The economic valuation of an environmental good is deducted by the revelation of consumer 
preferences which are expressed, by the WTP. It is noted that the total economic value of an 
environmental asset has not been always viewed in the same manner by economists. For 
example, according to Turner, Pearce and Bateman (1994) the total economic value of 
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environmental good is defined as the sum of the value of real use plus the existence value plus 
the option value. Munasinghe (1992) proposed a more detailed decomposition, since he 
considers that the total economic value equals to the use value plus non-use value (where the 
use value= the direct use value + indirect use value + option and the non-use value = legacy + 
the existence value). 
 
We note that the direct use value is that resulting from the use of the environment for 
production or consumption purposes. Option value, measures the satisfaction drawn by 
individuals when they know they can use an environmental asset, when they want (while 
deciding not to do so). For example, individuals can to enjoy from some satisfaction when they 
know the existence of woods forests although it isn’t necessary that they use them effectively.  
Option value can be obtained by investigation and can be positive, negative or indeterminate, if 
it was assessed in the uncertain. Non-use values are expected to correspond to a non utilitarist 
view to the environment. According to Lescuyer (2000), those values measure the benefits 
which individuals can have, subsequently, to the availability of environmental goods without 
they will be intended to be used.  Bequest value is linked to the desire of agents to transmit the 
environmental heritage for future generations. Existence values are based on moral or religious 
considerations encouraging to retain and protect, partially or totally, the ecosystem (as the 
protection of certain remarkable species). 
 
Thus for good estimation these values it is necessary to proceed by the method of contingent 
valuation. However the MCV may present difficulties in its implementation which are linked to 
the frequency of the biases. Those biases can be related to the investigators, the questionnaire 
structure, the nature of environmental goods and the credibility of the hypothetical market. 
Thus we must limit sources of bias in order to ensure the reliability of data. 
 
 
To value an environmental good we can resort to several methods. As illustration we can cite 
the open questions, the technique of card, the method of successive auction, the issue closed 
and double closed questions. The use of closed question in the first place and the question open 
in a second-time allows respondents to understand the hypothetical market and to reveal more 
honestly their WTP. 
 
2.1. Assessment preferences of individuals from a hypothetical scenario  
The CVM consists to directly question individuals, from a survey. The goal is to know, from an 
appropriate questionnaire, the amount that individuals are meadows to pay, ex-ante, for 
consumption, improvement or protection of environmental goods.  In this case individuals are 
placed in a hypothetical situation and the responses are considered as intentions. This occurs in 
the form of a transaction on a hypothetical market between an individual and a decision maker 
(generally public).  
 
In the practical case we construct a scenario that describes all the information necessary for the 
individuals which allowing them to report effective and just responses. Also the environmental 
asset, should be accurately describes (quantity, quality, the measures to increase its quantity or 
improve its quality).  Thus, to make the transaction, we should inform individuals surveyed 
how the amount to pay will be charged (mandatory levy or right of access).  The work of 
Tversky and Kahmenan (1981) shows that individual responses can be changed depending on 
the scenario structure or the form of the questionnaire itself. 
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2.2. Evaluation methodology and preference analysis 
As mentioned above the absence of prices does not allow identifying priorities for 
improvement of the environment together to the risks generated by resource wastage.  Thus, the 
decision maker faces a dualism in which a trade-off must be made: first the importance of 
environmental goods for the community and secondly the risk of wastage due to the absence of 
price mechanism allowing an optimal allocation of resources. 
 
To overcome this problem and in the absence of market several methods have been proposed to 
estimate the economic value of an environmental asset. In practice two methods were used:  the 
first is that related to hypothetical situations and the second is the method of preferences. The 
CVM belongs to this latter logic based on the economic well-being where individuals' 
preferences constitute the basis of the assessment.  
 
To determine the optimal value of the environmental goods (often considered as public) 
economic theory has proposed a number of models based on the individual utilities. For this 
reason, two methods are used.  The indirect method is based  on the observed actions of 
individuals while the direct method is based on individual declarations .In other terms,  the 
indirect method consists to reveal  the individual utilities  from to their observed  behavior, 
whereas the direct method consists to interview's  them using the technic of questionnaire  
(usually when the individual actions are  difficult to observe).  Among all the works who have 
tried to assess environmental assets we can refer to the work of  Bonnieux et al (1995) who has 
evaluated a  WTP of consumers for the improvement the water quality in "Rade de Brest", by 
the estimation of its value of use. Furthermore, Letheux Anne Stenger (1997) determined a 
WTP to preserve groundwater quality by estimating the values of use and non-use of this 
environmental asset. Freeman (1979) has shown that non-use values represent 60% to 80% of 
the economic value of an environmental good. 
 
3. Contingent valuation and determination of WTP  
 
To evaluate the WTP for improvement or preservation of environmental assets, it is necessary 
to identify their determinants. For this reason, series econometric regressions were used. 
Therefore, in the case of open questions the revelation of WTP generally leads to zero or to the 
consumer refusal to reveal their level of WTP.  
In addition, some respondents stated a zero level of WTP because their utility level remains 
constant, regardless of, change in their state of environmental assets use. However; even if the 
quality and availability of the resource can be increased, the WTP still poses some problems 
which are justified in most of the time by the consumer income insufficiency to support such a 
payment. Indeed, the observed zero values are considered as true zeros by against the answers 
of respondents who reported a null WTP are considered false zeros. In these cases their WTP 
does not actually correspond to the true value for a proposed contingent valuation. To 
overcome these difficulties, several methods are used to make a reliable estimate of the WTP. 
Terra (2005) has shown that if the proportion of true zero is low (10% threshold), the proposed 
model is that of Heckman (1976) if not the Tobit model should be used. 
 
3.1. Determination of the value of environmental products from WTP  
 
Economic theory shows that it is possible to give monetary values to environmental goods for 
which are not valued by market mechanisms. To assess environmental goods, Stephane Luchini 
(2002) presented a formal framework in which he highlights the essential principles of 
economic analysis.  He considered (n) commodity and (l) environmental goods considered as 
public. The principle is to identify the value of individual satisfaction which depends on their 
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consumption of commodities and of environmental goods. 
iU(X , )Z                                                                                                                       
Where;  
iX  : Vector of n commodities. 
 Z  : Vector of l environmental products  
It is assumed that the consumer maximizes his utility as follows: 
iMax U(X , )Z                                                                                                              
U/C i iPX Y  
Where; P is a vector of prices and iY  the income vector of individual i.  
The individual optimization program leads to define the classic demand functions as follows: 
( , , )k ki i iX h P Z Y       :1............k K                                                                             
where; k indicates the k
-th
 commodity. 
 
On the basis of the demand functions, indirect utility function of a representative individual i is 
defined by:  
( , , ) [ ( , , ), ]i i i i iV P Z Y U h P Z Y Z                                                                                   
 
In the practical case we construct a scenario that describes all the information necessary for the 
individuals allowing them to report effective and just responses. Also the environmental good 
must, be accurately describes (quantity, quality, measures to increase its quantity or improve its 
quality).  Also, to make the transaction, we should inform individuals surveyed how the amount 
to pay will be charged (mandatory levy or right of access).  The work of Tversky and 
Kahmenan (1981) show that individual responses can be changed depending on the scenario 
structure or the form of the questionnaire itself.  
 
Recall that environmental goods are offered, in general,   outside market. Therefore, the 
absence of prices can generate some problems, as the no improvement of the environment and 
the risk linked to   waste of resources. Thus, the decision maker faces a dualism in which a 
trade-off must be made: first the importance of environmental assets for the community and 
secondly the waste of resources that may be due to the absence of price mechanism which 
allows, in general, an optimal allocation of resources. 
If it is assumed that 
0Z  is the initial vector environmental goods and 
1Z  is a vector for which 
there has been an increase at least in one of its elements ( 
1 0Z Z ) 
Thus we will have: 
1 1 0 0( , , ) ( , , )i i i i i iU V P Z Y U V P Z Y                                                                            
Therefore, the measurement of the compensating variation of the modification of well- being is 
defined by: 
 
Vi (P, Z
1
, Yi- WTPi)= Vi (Pi, Z
0
, Y)=Ui
0 
This compensating variation is the amount of WTP collected from the individuals after change 
in the vector of environmental products (from the state 
0Z  to
1Z ). The WTP is considered as a 
reduction of individuals incomes, after the evolution of the quantity or the improvement of 
quality of environmental goods. The benefits associated with the evolution of environmental 
components are obtained by the sum of WTP.  
3.2. Econometric formalization of WTP  
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The econometric analysis aims to estimate a WTP model taking into account the explanatory 
variables from the questionnaire. In the case of an open question, the econometric specification 
is a model whose dependent variable is the WTP.  In the case of the technical of referendum, 
the econometric specification obtained is a binary choice model (Hanemam 1984, Fadden and 
Leonard 1993). Thus, the dependent variable (WTP) is said qualitative on two modalities (yes 
and no). The specific econometric model for the WTP must be compatible with the usual 
assumptions of economic theory. Fadden and Leonard (1993) proposed a model that proceeds 
to a transformation on the type of Box-Cox, of the variable to explain. Indeed, for an individual 
i, the model is written as follows: 
( , , ) ( , , )i i i iG WTP Y Z X        
with:  
WTPi: the willingness to pay of individual i  
Yi: the level of its income  
( ,  ): A parameter vector  
i  : Term of error associated to individual i  
 In addition, the function G (.) is defined by: 
   
1 1
                                si 0
( )
( , , )       si 0 
1
log(1 / )             1
i
i i i
i i
i
WTP
Y Y WTP
G WTP Y
WTP Y si
 

 


 


 
 

  
  
 
The Box-Cox transformation of the dependent variable allows great flexibility in the 
relationship between income and WTP. Then, if 0  the econometric model becomes a 
simple linear model and if the value of   is equal to 1we obtain a logarithmic model. 
Therefore, the parameter   is interpreted as the share of WTP relative to household income. 
The function ( , , )i i iZ Z X    takes in consideration individual heterogeneity; based on the 
observable characteristics of individuals. Thus, in this case we simply deduct the WTPi. 
 
Indeed, 
1 1( )
( , , ) ( , , )
1
i i i
i i i i i
Y Y WTP
Z Z X G WTP Y
 
  

  
  

                                        
1 1( ) (1 )i i i iY Y WTP Z
                                                                              
1 1( ) (1 )i i i iY WTP Y Z
            
1
1 1(1 )i i i iY WTP Y Z
                                                                              
1
1 1(1 )i i i iWTP Y Y Z
                                                                              
In addition, if the WTP of individual (i) is positive, then the WTPi has density: 
( ( , , ), )
( , , , )
( )i
Z i i
WTP i i
i i
f G WTP Y
f WTP Y
Y WTP 
 
  

      
This density is used to estimate the  WTP model  by the method of maximum likelihood, by 
making assumptions about the law of error term based on this density. In the case of a 
continuous discrete choice question, the distribution of WTP is treated from a censored model   
at the right. Thus, if an individual i declare a zero level of WTP then its distribution function 
7 
 
will be ( ( , , ), )Z iF G M Y    ; and if he accepts to pay the amount M its distribution function is 
1 ( ( , , ), )Z iF G M Y    .  
 
3.3. Measure of the surplus change  
 
As the environment has no price, the WTP and surplus are confused, ie that the measure of the 
surplus returns to measure the WTP. In the case of an improvement; the surplus measures the 
maximum amount an individual is near to pay. However, in case of deterioration, surplus 
measures the minimum amount that an individual will accept to pay. For consumers, the WTP 
is represented by the market price and the surplus they can have. For a producer WTP is equal 
to the market price (cost of production) plus the surplus he can have. 
 
Consequently, the economic assessment is based on the principle of measuring the change in 
consumer and producer surplus. Indeed the surplus is the amount of welfare lost by the agent in 
the event of loss of environmental assets. However, when the environmental asset is conserved 
the surplus is maintained at its initial level. So, when an individual is asked to raise its WTP to 
protect or improve an environmental product; its response is considered as surplus variation. 
 
According Mishan (1988), the normative economic theory states that the maximum amount an 
individual is near to pay for a property, is equivalent to the benefit and to satisfaction that he 
hopes to have from it. In this regard, if an environmental asset became available, the benefits 
associated to it are the sum of the willingness to pay of all the agents concerned by the supply 
of that asset.   
 
The price that individuals accept to pay is an indicator of the value of perceived benefits and 
satisfactions. Therefore, if the price matches the production costs, there is no real gain to 
society, but only a resource transfers from consumers to producers. In contrast, there is a real 
gain if consumers are willing to pay a higher amount relatively to market price. 
The revealed amount constitutes the compensatory surplus. To describe this surplus, Mitchell 
and Carson 1989 have used the following equation: 
 
Surplus offset = 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1( ( ) ) ( ( ) )e p q u y e p q u y   0 1y y         
Where ; 
e : The expenditure function  
p : The price of the public product  
q  : The quantity of product  
u  : Utility level  
y :The minimum amount of income needed to maintain the level of utility.
              
 
 
3.4. The mean WTP 
 
As cited above, the MEC is an estimation technique of the value of an environmental good or 
service, through an investigation in which individuals are requested to reveal their WTP for a 
given change, in the provision of an environmental good. The maximum value of WTP for this 
changes (improvement of the environment); reflects the level and degree of attachment of the 
individual to such a change. To calculate the WTP mean, Vincont Millot (2007) assumed that 
the choice is dichotomous:  the individual reaches the   utility level U1 if he accepts a given 
offer and pays a given amount while he reaches the utility level U0 if he refuses the offer. 
Indeed, 
8 
 
1 1 1 1(1, , ) (1, , ) ( )U r t s V r t s a b r t                                                           
And, 
0 0 0 0(0, , ) (0, , )U r s V r s a br       
with;  
1: If the individual accepts the offer  
0: if the individual refuses the offer  
r:  the individual income 
s: the level of subsidization 
t:  the amount to pay 
 
Suppose; 
1 0(1, , ) (0, , )U U r t s U r s                                                                         
1 0 1 0( ) ( )a a bt        
0 1t      
With; 0 1 0a a    
1 b    
1 0     
To calculate the WTP we equalize U  to zero. To determine the amount ultimately payable, 
we will have then 0
1
t
 

 
    
Thus, the mean WTP is given by: 
0
1
( )E t



  since ( ) 0E      
 
4. Change in the utility function of an environmental product  
4.1. Jean Tirole Model  
The realization of a social pricing of environmental assets requires a change in the utility 
function of consumers. In this context, Jean Tirole (1988) assumed that consumers have the 
following preferences; 
U=  iV(q)-T     if the consumers consume q and pay T (linear tariff)  
U = 0                if not 
with:  
V(.) is concave function, similar for all consumers and verifies the following conditions:  
V(0)=0; V’(q) 0; and V’’(q) 0 
i
: is a parameter of taste that varied from one consumer to  another. 
 
In our analysis we assume that there are two types of consumers. Those having taste parameter 
1  represent the proportion   while those who having taste parameter 2 represent the 
proportion  1-   (with 1 2) 
We also assume that the marginal cost (c) of the monopoly is constant. 
 
For mathematical development, Tirole  assumes that; V(q) =    (which satisfies the 
above properties). The consumer will maximize: 
i  i  
The first order condition gives: 
i V’(q) = p 
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 q = 1- = Di (p) 
 
The consumer surplus will be: 
Si (p) =  - Di (p) p 
          =  
The price of monopoly is to maximize its profit (Pc) D(P), with D(P) is defined by the 
aggregate demand: 
 
D(P)= λD1(P) + (1-λ) D2(P) 
= λ (1- ) + ((1 –λ)(1- ) 
=1- P(  + ) = 1 -   
Then the monopoly program returns to: 
Max  = (P – c) D(P) = (P – c)(1 -  ) 
The first order condition gives us; 
 = 0 => (1 -  ) -  ( P – c) = 0 
      => p
m
 =     (monopoly price)  
thus, the profit of the monopoly is given as follows; 
m 
= (p
m
 – c) (1 -  ) 
  
 
4.2. Expansion in the utility function  
 
Until now all models proposed, suggest that the rate T is linear. This specification is not, often, 
able to describe the reality because many goods are characterized by heterogeneity in 
their physical natures; causing differentiation in consumer behavior due to their 
consumption of such goods. If we assume that the environmental asset is perceived 
differently by consumers (the existence of several types of their physical quality). In this 
situation and for social equity reasons, the price cannot be linear. In this case consumer 
preferences become:  
U=  iV(q)-T     if T= (P+ )q  
U = 0                if not 
 
 
Where; t is a tax on the nature of the quality of a product and   is a coefficient proportional to 
the parameter of taste in this situation:  
U=  
The first order condition gives us; 
 +  
 q = 1-    
In this case, the consumer surplus is: 
Si(P)=  
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 Si(P)=  
And the program of monopoly becomes: 
Max = (P+αt-c)D(P)  
Where   
 
Max  ; thus we deduce the monopoly price : 
 
 
P
m 
 –αt; which give us the monopoly profit 
  
 𝜋 m=  (Monopoly profit) 
Discussion and implications: 
- If the consumer has a bad taste he should pay T=(p–t)*q (the consumer  recovers  the 
tax, ie α= –1). 
Indeed, the new surplus Si(P)=  >  (Jean Tirole model) 
and, 
the new profit =  >  ( Jean Tirole model). In this case it is evident that an 
improvement in the social well-being will be done (W=S+ ) 
 
- If the consumer has a good taste he should pay T=(p+t)*q (the consumer support and 
pay the tax and  ie α= +1) 
 
The new surplus Si(P)=  <  (Jean Tirole model) 
  
The new profit =  <  (Jean Tirole model). Thus, in this case we observe a 
decrease in the social surplus. However, the pricing policy is part of solidarity, and social 
altruism. Indeed, a social assistance principle can be built by creating a social policy of 
crossover subsidy within consumer groups. Indeed, the integration of quality factor in the 
pricing model seems to be important since it allows providing some measure of social equity 
within consumers of an environmental asset. This is justified by the variations which have 
affected consumer surplus, the price and the profit of monopoly. 
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models Surplus d’un consommateur  Prix de monopole Profit de monopole  
 Jean Tirole 
model 
   
Extension  
 
P
m 
 –αt 𝜋 m=  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The objective of the environmental assessment method is the ease of public decision making. 
This is through the estimation of the benefits from the implementation of environmental 
projects (Carson 2000), or by an increase in social welfare. And the CVM has the ability to 
estimate the economic value of a product or an environmental project for which there is no 
price market.  
In addition, the valuation of environmental products intended to ensure the sustainability of its 
property and followed an ecosystem. In other words this valuation must keep the objectives of 
economic efficiency and social equity in the consumption of its environmental assets. Indeed, 
the environmental quality of a property shall be included in the utility function of consumers as 
the physical quality of environmental products is unevenly distributed among households. 
Examples include the consumption of drinking water, and in this area a quality problem in the 
quantities offered was made. Finally the integration of the concept of quality in the utility 
function in a proportional tax has therefore change the consumer surplus and the price and 
profit of the monopoly. 
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